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Consciousness is an enigma, perhaps the greatest enigma of philosophy of science. It can be described as a multilevel phenom-
enon, where transition (from unconsciousness to consciousness) is not a compromise OFF / ON in neuronal activity, but involves 
a complex change in nerve function, which is mediated by the environment (1). For the analysis of consciousness, the Australian 
philosopher David J. Chalmers distinguishes the easy problem of the hard problem of consciousness. The easy problem to analyze 
issues such as discrimination between sensory stimuli, the integration of information to guide behavior, verbalization of internal 
states, the integration of sensory information with past experience, how to focus attention, and what distinguishes waking from 
sleep. On the other hand, the “hard problem” of consciousness is to explain how the physical brain gives rise to consciousness. 
This analysis deals with the latter. Biomed Rev 2011; 22: 85-89.
approach to thE thEorY of mind-brain idEntitY
Analysis the hard problem of consciousness begins by question 
how the mind (thoughts, feelings, etc) can be explained in terms 
of what we know as matter? The “Identity Theory” anticipated 
by the British philosopher Ullin Place to “Is Consciousness a 
Brain Process” in 1956, and John Smart with “Sensations and 
Brain Processes” in 1959, says that perceptions and conscious-
ness are physical processes in the brain, just as the rainbow is a 
physical process in the atmosphere (appearance of a spectrum 
of different light frequencies on the sky) (2,3).
Smart and Place propose that mental processes are identical 
to brain processes, if and only if, mental states are something 
material - but not behavior, that should be assumed is identical 
to the internal physical states (4). But if the mind is ultimately 
matter, then how is it built? They identify conscious states 
with brain states, which raises the question: where interac-
tion occurs between these states? Since conscious states and 
physical states are the same thing, there is no need to interact. 
They “become” together.
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Joy, for example, is a physical state (because the body 
produces dopamine, endorphins, oxytocin and serotonin) and 
conscious (produces shiny inner state) that causes some actions 
that are both states, physical and conscious (general welfare 
is generating high levels of energy and a strong willingness 
to constructive action, which the person who experiences it, 
reveal in their appearance, language, decisions and actions) 
(5). Related in this context, the concept of identity makes the 
conscious brain “primary and reflective” will be equal to mind.
Danko Georgiev in his Commentary in the present volume 
of Biomedical Reviews (6), states that it has been suggested 
in our Dance Round “… that the mind-brain identity thesis 
applies to “events of sensations” and “distributed processes 
in the brain”. Such a definition however is vacuous. There are 
various distributed processes in the brain that do not produce 
conscious experiences. Furthermore, the events of sensations 
are by definition mental and to say that conscious experiences 
are associated with brain states or processes that produce 
sensation is circular” (6,7).
On the contrary, Capra (8) distinguishes two types of 
consciousness: (i) primary consciousness, which is the direct 
experience of perceptions, sensations, thoughts and memory 
contents and images, dreams and daydream, and (ii) reflective 
consciousness that is the conscious experience per se. The latter 
is necessary for self-consciousness, which involves realizing 
being a unique individual separate from others, with a personal 
and future history. The reflective consciousness includes the 
process of integration, namely, to observe one’s own mind and 
its functions, in other words, know we know.
While it is true that the conscious experience in the nor-
mal adult human consciousness involves both primary and 
reflective consciousness, in this context we should argue that 
conscious experience is not always associated with brain states 
or processes that produce sensations. Therefore, the statement 
“to say the events of sensations are by definition mental and 
to say that conscious experiences are associated with brain 
states or processes that produce sensations is circular” is not 
always correct.
According to the American philosopher David Lewis in his 
An argument for the identity theory, and the Australian phi-
losopher David Malet Armstrong the theory of identity might 
be extended to all that is mental, “not only awareness and 
perceptions: all states mental are physical states in the brain, 
all mental processes are brain processes” (9). Therefore, the 
mental processes are playing a “causal role”: a mental state 
(e.g. happiness) can cause behavior, and it does because it is 
a brain state.
According to Hillary Putnam’s argument not only humans 
but also for example, amphibians, or aliens if any, may have 
feelings. However it seems unlikely that all beings with the 
same feelings are in the same brain state: if this is not the case, 
then feeling can not be identical to a particular brain state. On 
this basis he argues that the identity theory lacks empirical 
foundation (10). “Even if it happens that a particular brain 
state is bound in each case with a single “mental state” in a 
person, the absolute correlation between mental state and brain 
state does not necessarily mean that both states are in fact one 
and the same” (10).
Further query is whether a state of mind (which is a brain 
state) is caused by and/or causes behavior. For example, the 
rainbow is not the only physical process of the atmosphere, 
but is caused for this physical process (the sun’s rays suffer 
a breakdown when crossing water droplets contained in the 
atmosphere). Then, a mental state is defined by its causal role: 
what caused the mental state, which produced in turn for this 
mental state, and its relationship to other mental states. As 
we can see, consciousness is not a passive phenomenon in 
response to stimuli, but an active process of interpretation, 
construction and re-interpretation of data (11).
thE problEm of EvolutionarY causalitY.
According to the theory of evolution, things that are not caus-
ally effective not lead to evolutionary advantage and can not 
be perpetuated by natural selection (12). The theory of mind-
brain identity is an attempt to resolve this issue, and argues 
that mental states are brain states, which make mental states 
are causally effective and capable of producing evolutionary 
advantage (12). This type of causality exemplifies very well 
the behavior of elementary physics particles that are governed 
by the wave function as it has been demonstrated in the BMR 
Commentary by Danko Georgiev (6 and references therein).
The individual particle can not have a single wave function 
because wave function can be found in an infinite number 
of possible states in the multidimensional-material space of 
Hilbert, where each axis represents a possible state. Ie, the 
particle may be in infinite states, and hence the Hilbert space 
is of infinite size. At this time, the particle is an unobservable 
mental state, described as “the time before being detected 
probabilistically.” 
When the individual particle interacts with other particles, 
each of these “possible states” is selected to be updated (de-
termined), ie a system of interacting particles creates a wave 
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function (which depends on the boundary conditions, which 
include the initial position of the particle and its environment), 
so the new position of the particle and the new environment 
will serve as a condition for determining the position of the 
particle through the Schrodinger equation.
Sir John Eccles suggests that mental events are caused in 
the brain in a way analogous to how the wave function makes 
a particle being in a particular position at any given time, and 
asserts that consciousness can have different levels of com-
plexity formed from simple mental properties attributed to 
quantum particles. As the quantum laws are indeterminate, it 
is possible to construct a theory in which the mind and brain 
states interact: brain states deterministically produce a mental 
state, mental state makes a choice of multiple indeterministic 
alternatives and selects a mental state in the future. This ar-
gument would explain why not all brain states cause mental 
states, why there are mental processes that do not accompany 
any behavior, and why there are mental states that seem to 
involve other mental states. Based on the foregoing, we af-
firm that interactionist dualism presented by Georgiev is not 
necessarily a dualistic view in the classic sense, but should be 
considered rather as a new type of non-reductive physicalism, 
which is to argue that it is not necessary to postulate for the 
soul or mind a second metaphysical entity. For this position, 
the soul or mind are physiologically expressed or embodied 
in our person. This proposal is intended to reconcile our views 
on body, soul, mind and brain. To that end we agree with the 
basic requirements of the presented model.
validitY of sciEntific rEsEarch of consciousnEss 
In the research of consciousness, the validity has two main 
tasks: (i) the development and refinement of theoretical ap-
proaches of consciousness , which we have discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, and (ii) the construction of instruments 
and procedures for measurement of the consciousness, which 
we discuss in the next part. 
A reliable measure is measuring a construct consistent over 
time, people and situations, it is also one that measures what 
it purports to measure (13). A measure can be reliable without 
being valid. Therefore, the reliability is necessary but not suf-
ficient to prove the validity (14). In research on consciousness, 
as in other studies, internal and external validity seem to con-
tradict each other (14,15). To get an experimental design you 
have to control for all interfering variables. That’s why you 
often conduct your experiment in a laboratory setting. While 
gaining internal validity (excluding interfering variables by 
keeping them constant) you lose ecological or external validity 
because you establish an artificial lab setting. On the other hand 
with observational research you can’t control for interfering 
variables (low internal validity) but you can measure in the 
natural (ecological) environment, at the place where behavior 
normally occurs. However, in doing so, you sacrifice internal 
validity (14,15).
The apparent contradiction of internal validity and external 
validity is, however, only superficial. The question of whether 
results from a particular study generalize to other people, 
places or times arises only when one follows an inductivist 
research strategy. If the goal of a study is to deductively test 
a theory, one is only concerned with factors which might 
undermine the rigor of the study, i.e. threats to internal va-
lidity (14,15). One particular implication entailed from the 
interactionist perspective as exposed above is related to the 
poor validity of that model when applied for instance to the 
cases of shared psychiatric and neuroscience taxonomy (16).
our contribution
We propose a change in concept between the “mind-brain 
dissociation”, for “pragmatic and functional unit mind-brain”, 
without the pretense of the eliminativist reduction. Here we 
argue that interactionist dualism proposed by Karl Popper and 
John Eccles, where mind, though different from the material 
brain, interacts with the brain and depends upon it, is based 
on the principle that mind and matter are “substances” dif-
ferent from each other (material and immaterial substance), 
affirmation that for several centuries has been ruled out by 
face with the problem of the need for the existence of a place 
of interaction between “such substances” (17).
By mentioning that the interactionism was refuted for over 
40 years, we refer that before reading the work of Eccles - The 
Understanding of the Brain (1973) - most neuroscientists 
intuitively had perceived a gap between mental and physical 
phenomena, which caused dualistic views that were replaced 
by purely materialistic positions, trying to better respond to 
questions such as where are performed the mental processes 
(17).
Moreover, we underline that one of the shortcomings 
of dualism was to propose the existence of mind-body like 
two supreme principles, uncreated, contours, independent, 
irreducible and antagonistic, and maintain the separation of 
an intelligible world of ideas, eternal, immutable and neces-
sary, of the sensible world of matter, temporal, mutable and 
corruptible (soul encased in a body) delineating two orders 
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that claimed to be “essentially different”. We believe this 
radical distinction between ideal and real being, normality 
and disease, between well thinking, and the thinking like the 
influences of the individual surroundings, restricts freedom 
of conscience and freedom for diagnosis, from the point of 
view that conscious  activity assessment must be holistic and 
multi-influenced (17).
Although Karl Popper in his model of “demarcation of sci-
ence” takes the psychoanalysis as an example to demonstrate 
the principle of falsifiability and qualifies as pseudoscience, he 
argues that it is rational and valuable as well. Remarking that 
a theory may well be meaningful without being scientific, and 
as such, “significance criteria” may not necessarily coincide 
with a “criterion of demarcation”, proposing that falsifiability 
is a property of statements and theories, and in itself is neutral.
Returning to the dilemma between dualism and material-
ism, we speak in favor of materialism as a driver of a new 
philosophy that is proclaimed as a science by neurosciences 
and psychiatry, called to find out the truths that help with life 
skills and values guide, offering new ways to validate research 
and new methods to know the truth.
Similarly, we agree that the cure is independent of the 
method, but sometimes is not independent of conditions un-
der which the method of healing is applied. We propose that 
stereotypes hinders diagnosis, we believe it is necessary to 
give answers to the reasons that hinder the lack of recognition, 
care and access to treatment for psychological problems in real 
people, so we argue that to improve the practice of psychiatry, 
the scientist needs to forget the point of view of all proposals 
that are reductive: mental states can not be reduced to behavior, 
brain states or functional states, but must be referred depending 
on the complexity of the individual (18).
This supports the eliminativist view that considers possible 
to reject the mind-body problem, because we think that it is 
wrong to ask how they fit the mental states and biological 
factors. We suggest that more should be accepted that human 
beings can be described in various ways: for example, mental 
or biological terms (19).
On the other side, from a purely scientific point of view, we 
consider that the “hard problem” of consciousness, namely, 
the physical processes that give rise to brain consciousness 
must be based on the special quality of what we call “mental”, 
where there must be something that is, for that body, from the 
point of view that constitutes the first person perspective. This 
is critical because it allows us to see the deficiencies in other 
definitions of philosophy of mind; such as it is the dispositional 
mental or mental is functional, and so on. If it were simply a 
mental gear in a chain of more functional processes: neuro-
physiological, chemical, mechanical, etc., then any being that 
had implemented an algorithm and the necessary parts could 
perform these functions, such as a robot (20).
We also argue that materialism is far from being able to 
answer the “hard problem”, as the subjective experience 
of consciousness means, ie the opposite of objectivity. In 
some writings of consciousness is considered synonymous 
with mind. However the mind includes unconscious mental 
processes (20).
We argue that consciousness is not a passive phenomenon 
in response to stimuli but an active process of interpretation 
and construction of external data memory, relating them in 
this context, we refer to “type of identity,” which makes the 
conscious brain (primary and reflective) will be equal to mind. 
It also refers to Anglo-Saxon literature that uses two different 
words, in Spanish is often translated as consciousness. The first 
is “awareness”, which translates into apperception; the second 
is “consciousness”, which translates into consciousness. This 
distinction is important because there is the English expression 
“unconscious awareness” which translates to “unconscious 
apperception.” Some authors define apperception as a state in 
which we access to information which can be used to control 
behavior (1, 20). 
On the other hand, in that current alternative version called 
the “pragmatic and functional unit mind-brain,” we propose 
that if the mind is the function performed by the brain, mental 
states would then be functional states, only if mental states are 
states functional regardless of specific brain states that occur. 
This supports the proposal by John Searle who insists that 
we must keep in mind that consciousness is caused by brain 
processes, but can not be reduced to these processes because 
it is a phenomenon of “first person”, or subjective, while the 
brain processes are phenomena of “third person”, i.e. objec-
tive ones (21,22).
We also address the evolutionary argument against epiphe-
nomenalism, that if consciousness is a sequence of conscious 
mental states and each of these states experiences some specific 
content, then consciousness must have had an evolutionary 
purpose. We refer at this point to Nicholas Humphrey, who 
claims that it is conscious to have feelings, as opposed to 
perceptions. Although in evolution some states are full of af-
fection (feelings) and other neutral with respect to the feelings 
(perceptions), both are enhanced by natural selection (mental 
Darwinism) (23).
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Finally, we maintain our position on pragmatism of function, 
in order to help psychiatry to improve the validity of diagnosis 
of mental disorders, considered as the product of brain activity. 
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